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Abstract
We investigate the e ects of introducing a linear labor income tax under the assumptions that individuals
have concerns for social status, that they can signal their relative standing by spending on a conspicuous
good, and that the tax revenue is redistributed by means of lump sum transfers. We show that the way social
status is deﬁned – i.e. how relative standing is computed and evaluated – crucially a ects the desirability of
the tax policy. More precisely, if status is ordinal then a labor income tax can decrease waste in conspicuous
consumption only if the distribution of pre-tax incomes (or earning potentials) is not too unequal. The
same applies for the tax to induce a Pareto improvement, but with the bound on pre-tax inequality being
smaller. Instead, if status is cardinal then neither requirement applies: for any degree of pre-tax inequality
we can ﬁnd a cardinal notion of status such that the introduction of a labor income tax induces both a
waste reduction and a strict Pareto improvement. However, under cardinal status a labor income tax is not
necessarily more desirable than under ordinal status. Indeed, if status is cardinal in the sense that the status
di erential between being considered rich and being considered poor is strongly dependent on the income
of the rich, then a labor income tax is more likely to increase social waste than under ordinal status.
Key words: social status, relative standing, consumption externalities, labor income, income tax,
signalling, conspicuous consumption, income inequality
JEL: D10, H30
1. Introduction
When people care about their relative standing in society the labor market is likely to produce ine cient
outcomes. Several contributions have investigated if and how taxing and redistributing labor income can
alleviate such an ine ciency (see Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1978; Oswald, 1983; Persson,
1995; Ireland, 1994, 1998, 2001; Corneo, 2002, and comments below). In this paper we show that, when
people have concerns for their relative standing, the desirability of taxing and redistributing labor income
depends on the shared notion of status, i.e. how people compute and evaluate their relative standing. More
precisely, we analyze how the shared notion of status a ects the desirability of a linear labor income tax
when the revenue is redistributed by means of lump sum transfers.
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1In line with our objective, we assume that social status depends on relative labor income.1 We also
posit that agents can only observe the overall distribution of labor incomes and the amount of income
spent on a conspicuous good. This naturally gives rise to a signalling game of conspicuous consumption
where the amount of income earned plays the twofold role of generating social status and granting the
purchasing power required for the signal. We stress that this feature of our model is an absolute novelty in
the literature relating social status to signaling games where, typically, status is generated by an exogenously
given resource (e.g. Ireland, 1994, 1998; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008b). In such a framework the choice
of how much to work is evidently a strategic variable and individually optimal choices can possibly lead
to ine ciencies. We show that the characteristics of such ine ciencies, and their possible cures, crucially
depend on the shared notion of status.
This paper is related to a small but growing literature on optimal labor income tax under relative con-
cerns. The ﬁrst contribution to investigate the issue is the seminal book by Duesenberry (1949) where an
entire chapter is devoted to proving that, if individuals care about the ratio between their consumption and
a weighted average of others’ consumption, then an income tax may be e cient. After a period of silence,
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) were the ﬁrst to tackle the issue again. Assuming that people directly care
about relative consumption, they ﬁnd that welfare maximization requires higher linear taxes. This result has
been later generalized by Oswald (1983) to non-linear tax rules.2 Both studies rely on a welfare function
to establish optimal tax schedules, hence taking into consideration also equity issues. Such a welfarist ap-
proach has not been followed by Persson (1995) who has showed that, under assumptions similar to Boskin
and Sheshinski (1978) and Oswald (1983), a linear income tax can induce a Pareto improvement. We too
constrain the analysis to e ciency issues.
Ireland (1994, 1998) has been the ﬁrst to follow the signalling approach which is similar to the one
that we also pursue here. He has shown that, if people care about their rank in the distribution of income,
an appropriate linear taxation policy can generate a Pareto improvement. In particular, if the range of pre-
tax earning capabilities is not too large, then a Pareto improving income tax exists in which the poor gain
from redistribution and the rich gain from a reduction in the expenditure required to signal their status.3 An
importantdi erencebetweenourmodelandtheonebyIreland(1998)isthatinthelatterstatusisassumedto
depend on the gross earning potential (wages) while in our model status is assumed to depend on net earned
income. If concerns for status are hardwired, then assuming social status to depend on the distribution of
gross earning potentials does not seem unreasonable (see for instance Rayo and Becker, 2007; Samuelson,
2004, for a discussion on why Nature may want people to have status concerns). However, if one thinks of
concerns for status as instrumental, i.e. arising because status provides the means for something else, then
net earned income may seem more appropriate (see Postlewaite, 1998, for a discussion of the advantages of
the instrumentalist approach).4 Furthermore, our approach allows us to take into account the status-driven
e ects – possibly perverse – of redistributing the tax revenue through lump sum transfers. This could not
1We abstract from other potentially relevant characteristics such as wealth or education, which would complicate the analysis
while not being directly inﬂuential on the issue.
2Importantly, Oswald (1983) shows that the results of Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) – that both the most and the least
productive individual should not be taxed – are not robust to the introduction of relative concerns.
3In Ireland (1994) it is also shown that universal beneﬁts in cash or in kind can mitigate the waste due to signalling – although
things are made more complex by means-testing because of its informational value.
4Consider, for instance, the case where status concerns are driven by concerns for the quality of social interactions (as in
Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996). Owing to the instrumental approach it must be that the quality of interactions depends positively on
status because people get more beneﬁts by interacting with high status people. If we restrict to labor income as the source of such
beneﬁts then it seems reasonable to assume that beneﬁts depend on consumption externalities. Hence, net earned income seems a
better candidate than gross earning potential as the status-bearing asset – a person with a large potential that earns nothing cannot
provide beneﬁts to peers in terms of consumption.
2be done properly in Ireland (1994, 1998) since, in equilibrium, social status is determined by exogenous
individual characteristics.
A framework similar to Ireland (1998) is applied in Ireland (2001) to study the desirability of tax pro-
gressivity in the case of quasi-linear tax schedules. It turns out that status concerns do not qualitatively a ect
standard results at the ﬁnite or asymptotic endpoints at the top of the type distribution and that, although
they imply steeper optimal tax schedules, they do not imply more progressivity. This result is somewhat
challenged, although not explicitly so, by Corneo (2002) who shows that if income is observable then not
only a progressive income tax can be Pareto improving but, in order to obtain undistorted choices of working
hours, it is required a progressive tax whose degree of progressivity decreases in pre-tax income inequality.
Our contribution is twofold. In the ﬁrst place, we analyze in detail the consequences of a labor income
tax under ordinal status – i.e. when people care only about their rank in the distribution of labor incomes.
Consistently with both Ireland (1998) and Corneo (2002), we show that much depends on the pre-tax wage
distribution. In addition, we characterize the relevant threshold values of the pre-tax wage distribution.
We ﬁnd that while low income (low wage) people are always made better o  by the introduction of a
labor income tax, the implications for high income (high wage) people and social waste in conspicuous
consumption depend on the degree of inequality in the wage distribution. If the wage distribution is highly
unequal then waste is increased and high income people are made worse o . If the wage distribution is
quite unequal then waste is decreased but high income people are still made worse o . Finally, if the wage
distribution is only mildly unequal then waste in conspicuous consumption is decreased and high income
people are made better o . These ﬁndings suggest that, under ordinal status, labor income taxes and wage
inequality can be a kind of substitutes in mitigating the ine ciencies produced by status-seeking behavior.
In the second place, we analyze the consequences of a labor income tax when status is not ordinal but
cardinal – i.e. when people also care about how far other people are in the distribution. We provide two
novel ﬁndings in this regard. First, we show that under cardinal status a redistribution can be Pareto improv-
ing even if earning potentials are extremely unequal. In particular, we identify a necessary and su cient
condition for a marginal labor income tax to be both waste reducing and Pareto improving. Second, we
prove that even in the presence of small di erentials in pre-tax wage rates – a case which leads to a re-
duction in waste under ordinal status – the amount of waste in signalling may increase. Moreover, since
a greater signalling induces high income individuals to earn more, this outcome can potentially make low
income individuals worse o  – as they may fall behind even further – notwithstanding the fact that they
command a greater income. Our results suggest that, under cardinal status, labor income taxes and wage
inequality need not be substitutes – actually, they might be complements – in mitigating the ine ciencies
of status-seeking behavior.
The intuition for the results under ordinal status is the following. A marginal increase in the labor
income tax makes low income people better o  because provides them with extra income that more than
compensates the loss in terms of reduced net wage rate. This makes conspicuous consumption less costly
for the poor because of decreasing marginal utility of both leisure and inconspicuous consumption, with
the result of increasing social competition for status (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, 2009a). However,
the labor tax also makes conspicuous consumption more costly in terms of the amount of work needed
to a ord it, contrasting the previous e ect. Which of the two e ects is greater determines whether waste
increases or decreases. A greater inequality in the wage distribution strengthens the ﬁrst e ect – because of
larger transfers – so making a waste reduction less likely. Furthermore, since a labor income tax necessarily
decreases the earning potential of high income people, we have that a large enough waste reduction is
required for high income people to be made better o .
Under cardinal status inequality has the additional e ect of modifying the value of status itself, hence
3a ecting the incentive to engage in wasteful social competition (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008b; Hopkins
and Kornienko, 2009b). In particular, if the status prize of the social competition diminishes then the
incentive to compete decreases. When this latter e ect dominates the sum of the e ects described above,
then a linear labor income tax is Pareto improving even if the pre-tax wage distribution (or earning potential)
is extremely unequal. This explains our ﬁrst result. The logic behind our second result is less evident. A
labor income tax whose revenue is evenly redistributed has two direct e ects: ﬁrst, the income of the rich
and the income of the poor become more similar and, second, it is easier for the poor to mimic the rich.
As described above, under cardinal status the ﬁrst e ect is likely to reduce the status prize for the social
competition and, therefore, to reduce the waste in signalling. The second e ect, which is present under
both cardinal and ordinal status, increases social competition and hence increases the waste in signalling.
In addition to these, there is an indirect e ect which arises because the object of signalling, i.e. own labor
income, is a choice variable whose optimal value is positively a ected by the signal. Indeed, a greater
signalling by the rich does not only imply that they have to work more in order to buy more conspicuous
goods, it also implies that their income is farther away from the income of the poor – with the result that
the social prize of being considered rich is greater. If the status di erential between the prize of being
considered rich and the prize of being considered poor strongly depends on the income of the rich then total
waste in signalling may increase even in the case where the ordinal e ect alone – i.e. the second e ect –
would have made it decrease. Interestingly enough, the indirect e ect also generates the possibility – which
is absent in the case of ordinal status – that a rise in the tax rate induces high income people to earn a greater
net income despite their lower net wage. This means that, when status is cardinal in the sense described
above, a greater tax rate may induce the top income earners to increase their work time substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the baseline model, providing the
technical results which are required for our analysis. In section 3 we state our main results for the cases
of both ordinal and cardinal status. Section 4 provides our conclusions and ﬁnal remarks. All proofs are
reported in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Our model is an extension of the one developed in Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008b), that in turn resem-
bles the model in Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). The novelty here is that the status-bearing asset is labor
income and, therefore, it is endogenously determined. This turns out to be a non-trivial modiﬁcation of the
model and allows us to investigate how the notion of status a ects the optimality of policies regarding the
taxation and redistribution of labor income.
We consider a population of agents consisting of two types – one with high labor productivity, the
other with low labor productivity – and whose income entirely depends on labor earnings, obtained in a
competitive labor market. Hereafter, the subscript h will be used to refer to the highly productive type while
the subscript l will be used to refer to the lowly productive type. No assumption is made on the size of
population, that can be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite, however agents are assumed not to take into account the
e ect of their labor supply on the government’s budget. A fraction     0 of population is of l-type agents
and a fraction (1    )   0 is of h-type agents. Types di er in their productivity which is, respectively, wh
and wl, with wh > wl > 0. The time endowment is Z > 0 and is the same for everyone. Individuals are
identical under any other respect.
Time can be allocated to either working or leisure while income can be allocated to the consumption
of either a conspicuous or an inconspicuous good. The price of the inconspicuous good is normalized to 1;
the price of the conspicuous good is p. Leisure is indicated with z, inconspicuous consumption with c and
4conspicuous consumption with x. Furthermore, we posit that one’s productivity, leisure and inconspicuous
consumption are all unobservable to other individuals while conspicuous consumption is observable.
Utility is assumed to be additive in three components measuring the individual beneﬁts accruing from,
respectively, inconspicuous consumption, leisure and status:
U(c,z, s) = ln(c) + aln(z) + s , (1)
where a > 0 represents the relative importance of leisure with respect to inconspicuous consumption and
socialstatus. Wemakeacoupleofremarksontheutilityfunction. First, notethattheconspicuousgooddoes
not generate utility directly. As explained afterwards, it serves only as a signal for labor income, and hence
as a means to gain status.5 Second, the utility from inconspicuous consumption and leisure are assumed
to be logarithmic. This is done because it allows us to keep the analysis tractable and more transparent.
More precisely, when utility is logarithmic, and in the absence of status-seeking e ects, an income tax leads
to income and substitution e ects on leisure which o set each other; this makes computations easier and
allows us to isolate the impact of status-seeking behavior.
The component s is assumed to depend on how individual income compares to the overall income
distribution. Let   be an income (cumulative) distribution on the support [0,Zwh] – the range of feasible
incomes – and let y be an income in [0,Zwh]. We write s( ,y) for the status of an individual who is believed
to possess income y when the overall distribution of incomes in the population is  . If individual incomes
were public information, then there would have been no gain by conspicuous consuming. However, the
income of every individual is private information. So, in order to attain status, individuals engage in a
signalling activity by consuming the conspicuous good x. More precisely, let µ(x) be the belief function
that associates the observation of the conspicuous consumption x with a distribution   of incomes and a
particular income y for the sender of signal x. Status is then given by s(µ(x)).
In the spirit of Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008a,b), we are interested in understanding how the model
predictions change when di erent notions of status are employed. In particular, we focus on two classes of
status functions which have received attention from the literature, namely ordinal status and cardinal status.
When status is ordinal people have concerns only for their rank in the distribution of incomes. Therefore,
s(  ,y ) = s( ,y) if  (y) =   (y ) and   (y) =    (y ).6 When status is cardinal, instead, people are possibly
interested in features of the income distribution di erent from rank. For instance, under cardinal status it
is likely to have s(  ,y) < s( ,y) when    ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates  , even if the rank of an
individual with income y is the same in    and  .
Finally, a linear tax   is levied on income and its revenue is equally distributed to all individuals by
means of a lump sum transfer T. Incomes of l-type agents and h-type agents are denoted, respectively, by
yl = (1    )wl(Z   zl) + T and yh = (1    )wh(Z   zh) + T. The hypothesis of balanced budget implies that
T =  
1   ( yl + (1    )yh).
The decision problem of the generic individual of type i, with i = h,l, can be described as
max
c,z,x
[ln(c) + aln(z) + s(µ(x))], s.t. c + px   yi . (2)
Since the budget constraint must hold with equality, (2) can be restated as
5In Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008b) we show that allowing x to be intrinsically beneﬁcial does not change the quality of results,
although it makes the analysis substantially more complex.
6In order to distinguish between individuals with not greater income and with strictly less income, we have used  (y) and   (y)
respectively, with   (y) = limˆ y y   (ˆ y).
5max
z,x
[ln(wi(Z   z)(1    )   px + T) + aln(z) + s(µ(x))] . (3)
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Next step is to choose an appropriate equilibrium concept for the model. We focus on symmetric Nash








i) maximizes utility of type i given µ , i = l,h;
2. beliefs are consistent:
(a) if x 
l   x 
h then µ (x 
l) = (y 
l,  ) and µ (x 
h) = (y 
h,  ) ,
(b) if x 
l = x 
h then µ (x 
l) = µ (x 
h) = ( y 
l + (1    )y 
h,  ) ;
where y 
l = (1 +  )wl(Z   z 
l) + T, y 
h = (1    )wh(Z   z 
h) + T, and    is the distribution where a fraction  
of population earns y 
l and a fraction (1    ) of population earns y 
h. To allow better readability of formulas,
we set L = s(y 
l,  ) and H = s(y 
h,  ). Given   , being considered to earn y 
h is assumed to provide a higher
status than being considered to earn y 
l, namely H > L.
The above deﬁnition of equilibrium imposes only weak restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In
particular, beliefs are only required to be such that a deviation is not convenient for both l-type and h-type
individuals. This great freedom in the choice of beliefs o  the equilibrium path determines the existence of
many pooling and separating equilibria, as in a standard signalling game. In order to get rid of this large
multiplicity, and to have a unique prediction to use in comparative statics exercises, we adapt to the current
setup the so-called Riley equilibrium, which is widely accepted as prominent equilibrium concept in sig-
nalling theory (see Riley, 2001). In particular, in the spirit of the Riley equilibrium, we look for a separating
equilibrium where the lower income group spend nothing on signalling and the higher income group spend
on signalling the minimum amount which makes a deviation not convenient for the lower income group.
Unlike standard signalling models, income is not exogenously ﬁxed, and both h-type individuals and l-type
individuals can in principle end up with higher income. Proposition 1 shows that indeed a unique equi-
librium exists, where the lower income group is composed of l-type individuals while the higher income
group is composed of h-type individuals. Furthermore, equilibrium values of conspicuous consumption and
leisure are derived for l-types and h-types, as well as the equilibrium lump sum transfer under balanced
budget.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium where l-types and h-types separate, the lower income
group spend nothing on signalling, and the higher income group spend on signalling the minimum amount
which makes a deviation not convenient for the lower income group. In such equilibrium:
y 
h > y 
l , (5)
x 
l = 0 , (6)
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We begin our analysis by considering the case where status is ordinal, that is, H and L are independent
















From (10) and (11) we obtain the following preliminary results.
Result 1. A greater income tax reduces the waste in conspicuous consumption if and only if dT/d  < wlZ.
Result 2. If dT/d  < wlZ at   = 0, then dT/d  < wlZ for all     [0,1].
From result 1 we see that a greater income tax decreases total wasting in conspicuous consumption if and
only if the earning potential of l-types, wlZ, is greater than the change in the transfer induced by the increase
in  . Intuitively, if l-types receive as a transfer more than what they can earn by having no leisure at all,
then a greater income tax will necessarily make them richer with the consequence that h-types will have to
spend more in conspicuous consumption in order to signal their status.
Moreover, from result 2 we see that if the introduction of a marginal labor income tax is waste reducing,
then any further increase in the tax entails a further reduction in waste. The reason is that the marginal
change in the amount of income transferred from h-types to l-types is bound to be smaller than its value at
  = 0. This is because, under homothetic preferences, a ﬂat labor income tax always decreases total income
and, hence, a rising tax rate can only add a decreasing amount of income to the lump sum transfer.
For the rest of this section we will focus on the case   = 0. This will greatly simplify the analysis.
Moreover, in the light of result 2, assuming   = 0 will allow us to take a conservative perspective on waste
reduction. Under   = 0 the condition dT/d  < wlZ is satisﬁed if and only if
wh
wl
< 1 + a
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7This shows that there is an upper bound to the degree of inequality in the distribution of wages, in line with
the insights provided by Ireland (1998) and Corneo (2002). Moreover, note that for a > 0 the right hand
side is smaller than unity if and only
(ln(1    )   ln( ))(1 + a) > H   L , (13)
meaning that a reduction in waste is possible only if the fraction   of l-types and the status di erential H L
are large enough. Intuitively, social competition for status must be strong enough – and hence waste must
be large enough in the ﬁrst place – for the introduction of an income tax to decrease waste.
Finally, we ask how the introduction of an income tax a ects the equilibrium income of both l-types
and h-types. The answer to this question is relevant in itself for obvious reasons. In addition, it will help to
better understand the e ects of the tax on individuals’ utility.
Result 3. A greater income tax increases l-types’ equilibrium income if and only if dT/d  > wlZ. Moreover,
a greater income tax always decreases h-types’ equilibrium income.
From result 2 and 3 we see that an income tax decreases waste if and only if it decreases the equilibrium
income of l-types. This is because a lower income makes l-types compete less ﬁercely for status – sig-
nalling becomes more costly for them – and, hence, it allows h-types to spend less in order to di erentiate
themselves from l-types. Then, from condition (12) we see that wh/wl <  x implies that l-types’ income
decreases while wh/wl >  x implies that l-types’ income increases.
Result 3 also clariﬁes the impact of a greater tax rate on h-types’ income. The intuition is the following.
When l-types’ income decreases, h-types ﬁnd it convenient to decrease their income as well since they
experience a lower net wage and they need less conspicuous consumption to di erentiate themselves from l-
types. When instead the income of l-types increases, then h-types spend more on conspicuous consumption
but, because of the reduced net wage, they ﬁnd it optimal to reduce their inconspicuous consumption even
more. Consequently, a greater tax rate always makes the rich poorer. Interestingly enough, we will show in
next section that this result only holds under ordinal status – i.e. under cardinal status h-types’ income may
increase as an e ect of a rise in the tax rate.
We now turn our attention to individuals’ utility. Di erentiating utility functions at equilibrium with
respect to   we obtain
dUl
d 







  1 , (14)
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By imposing the positiveness of both (14) and (15) we get the following inequalities, respectively
wh
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> 1   a
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8Note that for a > 0 inequality (16) is always satisﬁed as the right hand side is strictly smaller than one.
Moreover, for a > 0 the right hand side of (17) is strictly greater than one as the second term is positive.
This implies that there is a range of wage distributions where a marginal increase of   makes everyone
strictly better o . By combining conditions (13), (16) and (17) we obtain the following:
Proposition 2. The introduction of a marginal income tax whose revenue is evenly distributed makes l-types
better o . Moreover, it generates
i) a lower conspicuous consumption and a higher utility for h-types if wh/wl <  h;
ii) a lower conspicuous consumption and a lower utility for h-types if  h < wh/wl <  x;
iii) a greater conspicuous consumption and a lower utility for h-types if wh/wl >  x.
The proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix – it substantially consists of demonstrating that
 h <  x. Intuitively, if waste does not diminish then h-types cannot be better o  as they su er of both





                                            
waste decreased
l-types better o 
h-types better o 
 h
                                            
waste decreased
l-types better o 
h-types worse o 
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waste increased
l-types better o 
h-types worse o 
Figure 1: The e ects of a marginal increase in   as a function of wh/wl.
Further insights can be obtained by looking at how  x and  h vary in response to changes in the exoge-
nous parameters of the model, i.e. a,  , L   H, p and Z. From (13), (16) and (17) we immediately see that
p and Z play no role at all. The reasons are, respectively, that conspicuous consumption matters only for
its market value – if p changes then x  changes in such a way that the equilibrium values of px  remains
the same – and that types have identical endowments and homothetic preferences – changes in Z only have
scale e ects which leave  x and  h una ected.
Instead, a larger status di erential H   L, i.e. a greater net beneﬁt of being considered rich instead of
poor, induces a larger  x. This means that waste reduction is obtained for a larger range of wage distribu-
tions. The intuition here is that a greater status di erential increases the equilibrium amount of conspicuous
consumption and, hence, it makes the labor income tax more e ective in reducing waste.
Less obviously, the impact of a greater H   L on  h is non-monotonic. More precisely, it is negative
for H   L <  ln(1  
 
 )(1 + a) and positive for H   L >  ln(1  
 
 )(1 + a).8 This is because, besides
the positive e ect described for  x which is increasing in H   L, there is also a constant negative e ect: a
greater H   L makes h-types work more and, hence, being taxed more. For small values of H   L this latter
e ect dominates.
Finally, the impact of a greater preference for leisure a is ambiguous on both  x and  h. A greater a
makesbothl-typesandh-typesworkless. Thisreducestheequilibriumamountofconspicuousconsumption
8The cuto  value can be obtained by di erentiating  h with respect to H   L.
9and, hence, makes the labor income tax less e ective in reducing waste. However, a greater a also makes
the income of l-types and h-types more similar with the consequence of increasing the social competition
for status. This increases the incentive to conspicuously consume. Which e ect dominates depends on both
  and H   L.9
3.2. Cardinal Status
We now consider the case where status is cardinal, that is, both H and L depend on the equilibrium
incomes y 
l and y 
h, which in turn implies that H and L depend on  . Let Lyl, Lyh,Hyl and Hyh denote the
derivatives of L and H with respect to y 
l and y 
h.10 Let us also assume, as it seems reasonable, that Lyl   0,
Lyh   0, Hyl   0 and Hyh   0.
Ourmainpointhereisthat, undercardinalstatus, theintroductionofalaborincometaxhasanadditional
consequence which is otherwise absent under ordinal status: the prize of the social competition – i.e. the
subjective value of status itself – may change. This can be seen by di erentiating (7) with respect to   and
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Cardinal status direct e ect
.
(18)
By inspecting (18) we see that, besides the e ect already seen in the case of ordinal status – represented by
the ﬁrst term of the right hand side – there are two additional e ects. The ﬁrst is direct and is represented
by the second term of the right hand side. It accounts for the impact of   on H and L through its net
e ect on the transfer and the net wage. Note that both sign and magnitude of the term in square brackets
depend on Lyl   Hyl and Lyh   Hyh, that is, on how the status di erential is a ected by the equilibrium
incomes y 
l and y 
h. In principle, such a term could take any value because the deﬁnition of cardinal status
is general enough to be consistent with a wide range of values for both Lyl   Hyl and Lyh   Hyh. However,
it seems reasonable to believe that in most cases the term will be positive – and, hence, that the cardinal
direct e ect will be negative. For instance, this is the case whenever we impose a bit of symmetry such as
Lyl   Hyl + Lyh   Hyh = 0, i.e. an equal change in y 
l and y 
h leaves H   L una ected. Intuitively, while the
transfer a ects the status of l-types and h-types in the same way, the reduction in the income gap between
h-types and l-types decreases H   L. Therefore, the status of being considered rich becomes relatively less
desirable, thus decreasing the waste due to conspicuous consumption.
The second cardinal e ect is represented by the coe cient of dx /d  appearing on the left hand side of
(18). It is indirect in the sense that it accounts for the change in H generated by the variation of y 
h which, in
turn, is generated by a change in x  in the ﬁrst place. The intuition is the following. Because of the increase
in  , the amount of conspicuous consumption which makes l-types indi erent between being considered
rich and being considered poor also changes. This in turn a ects the choice of h-types about how much
to work and, hence, their income. Note that, however, it does not a ect the equilibrium choice of l-types.
Indeed, the coe cient contains the term Lyh Hyh but not the term Lyl Hyl. As a consequence of the change
9This can be seen by di erentiating  x and  h with respect to a.
10We implicitly assume that s is such that L and H are di erentiable.
10in y 
h, the status prizes H and L also change and this feedbacks on the amount of conspicuous consumption
x  which makes l-types indi erent between being considered rich and being considered poor.
Wenotethatthecoe cientof pdx /d couldbeinterpretedasthereciprocalofasortofwastemultiplier.
Since Lyh   Hyh   0 such a coe cient is never greater than unity. Hence, if it is greater than zero, we
have a reinforcing mechanism which magniﬁes the e ects of an increase in  , making labor taxation even
more e ective in reducing conspicuous consumption. In other words, a ﬁrst reduction in x  may trigger a
mechanism which further reduces x . Thus, under cardinal status we can have two additional e ects that
make a labor income tax more likely to reduce the equilibrium waste.
However, the cardinal indirect e ect may also work in the opposite direction if the di erence |Lyh  Hyh|
is so large that the coe cient of pdx /d  turns negative.11 In such a case we have that the indirect e ect
triggered by the ﬁrst change in x  more than o sets the latter. For instance, we might have that an increase
in   has the direct e ect of making the status prize less attractive and conspicuous consumption more costly
but, because it makes the incomes of l-types and h-types more similar, it requires a greater conspicuous
consumption for l-types to be indi erent between being considered rich and being considered poor; this,
in turn, forces h-types to work more and hence increases both their income and the status prize of being
considered rich; if the coe cient of pdx /d  is negative then this latter e ect dominates resulting in an
overall increase in x . This novel ﬁnding is a peculiar outcome of the interaction of two characteristics of
our signalling model, namely the cardinality of status and the endogeneity of the status-bearing asset.12
In conclusion, under cardinal status we have two additional e ects of   which can act to either increase
or decrease the waste in conspicuous consumption. As a result, the range of wage distributions – i.e. values
of wh/wl – for which waste decreases can di er both qualitatively and quantitatively from the range obtained
under ordinal status. More precisely, there is a direct e ect that, under reasonable assumptions, decreases
waste and an indirect e ect that operates in the same direction unless the status di erential between being
considered rich and being considered poor is too sensitive to the equilibrium income of h-types.
For the sake of concreteness, in next proposition we illustrate the link among the indirect cardinal e ect,
the change in the income gap, and the change in waste, for the special case where cardinal status depends
on the income gap.13
Proposition 3. Let both L and H depend on the income gap (yh   yl). Then, a marginal increase in   gen-
erates a negative cardinal status indirect e ect if and only if it increases the di erence between equilibrium
incomes of l-types and h-types, which in turn implies that the waste px  increases, namely
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Proposition 3 tells us that two important things happen when status is cardinal in the sense that it depends
on income di erences. First, a greater sensitivity of the status prize to the income of the rich makes a greater
tax rate more likely to increase waste. This means that, for a given value of wh/wl, we can have that a greater
tax rate increases waste under cardinal status while it decreases waste under ordinal status and viceversa.
Second, a greater tax rate can increase the equilibrium income gap only if waste increases. Therefore, a
11We abstract from the case where (1 + a)2 =  e
L H
1+a (Lyh Hyh)awlZ and therefore dx /d  cannot be determined (the hypotheses
of the Implicit Function Theorem are not met). Intuitively, a small variation of x  is not su cient to re-establish equilibrium
conditions since it induces behaviors which in turn require a further and almost identical variation of x .
12In Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008b) we do not observe such an e ect because the status bearing-asset is exogenous.
13This speciﬁcation of concerns for status is rather common in the literature, see for instance Clark and Oswald (1998) and
Cooper et al. (2001).
11greater waste is a prerequisite for a greater tax rate to increase post-tax income inequality. In other words,
in order for the income tax to be socially e cient it must not increase post-tax inequality as measured by
the income gap.14
One further aspect of cardinal status that is worth mentioning is that dT/d  is not granted anymore to
be decreasing in  . In fact we have the following
Result 4. If dT/d  < wlZ at   = 0 and d(H   L)/d    0, then dT/d  < wlZ for all     [0,1].
The reason is that, if the impact of a greater   on H   L is positive, then people are induced to work more
and, hence, the marginal transfer increases in  .
In the following we will continue to focus on the case of   = 0.15 Besides providing a better analytical
tractability, at   = 0 we can have a more neat comparison with the results obtained under ordinal status.
However, from result 4, and more in general from the fact that cardinal e ects may be large and of either
sign, we see that assuming   = 0 is no longer a conservative perspective on waste reduction.
We now turn our attention to individuals’ utility. Di erentiating utility functions at equilibrium with
respect to   we get the counterparts of (14) and (15) under cardinal status
dUl
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By manipulating (20) and (21) we get that utility increases when, respectively
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From (22) we see that the impact of   on y 
l and y 
h, and hence on L, can increase or decrease the threshold
value of wh/wl for which l-types are made better o . In particular, di erently from what seen for ordinal sta-
tus, under cardinal status the introduction of a labor income tax may make l-types worse o : if L decreases
14Proposition 3 holds for the case of ordinal status too. When status is ordinal we have that Hyh   Lyh = 0 implying that the
income gap between h-types and l-types cannot increase. In the light of result 3 this means that under ordinal status the introduction
of a marginal income tax decreases waste if and only if decreases the income of l-types not more than the income of h-types.
15Note that in   = 0 the marginal transfer dT/d  is the same as under ordinal status.
12enough to o set the positive ordinal status e ect, then l-types’ utility decreases. Notably, this may happen
even if the equilibrium income of l-types increases. In fact, a higher tax rate may increase the expenditure
in signalling by the h-types, and then induce them to work enough more to obtain a higher income, which
reduces l-types’ social status to an extent that may potentially lower their overall utility.
From (23) we see that also the threshold value of wh/wl for which h-types are made better o  depends on
how   a ects the equilibrium incomes and then the status prize. However, in this case both the variation in
the status of poor and the variation in the status of rich matter, and the reason is that both H and L a ect the
equilibrium amount of conspicuous consumption x . In particular, we see that the new threshold is given by
the sum of  h – which is got by imposing that the ﬁrst term in (23) is greater than zero – and the net cardinal
e ects of L and H. The cardinal e ect of L has the same sign of Lyl(dy 
l/d ) + Lyh(dy 
h/d ) meaning that a
rise in the status prize of being considered poor positively a ects the utility of h-types. The reason is that a
greater L makes l-types less inclined to compete for being considered rich and, therefore, it allows h-types
to spend less on conspicuous consumption. On the contrary, a change in H has two e ects which counteract
each other. On the one side, an increase of H raises the equilibrium utility of H-types directly. On the other
side, however, it increases the social prize of being considered rich and therefore, in equilibrium, it makes
h-types spend more on wasteful conspicuous consumption in order to discourage l-types from emulation.
As (23) reveals, the former e ect always prevails, and the cardinal e ect of H comes out to be of the same
sign of Hyl(dy 
l/d ) + Hyh(dy 
h/d ).
Together inequalities (22) and (23) give the necessary and su cient conditions for the introduction of
a marginal income tax to generate a Pareto improvement. The following proposition reports an important
implication of such conditions.
Proposition 4. For any value of wh/wl > 1, there exist di erentiable functions H(yh,yl) and L(yh,yl), with
Lyl   0, Lyh   0, Hyl   0 and Hyh   0, such that the introduction of a marginal labor income tax whose
revenue is evenly distributed induces both a reduction in waste and a strict Pareto improvement.
The proof of proposition 4 is given in the Appendix. Here we just provide the intuition of the result. Fix
wh/wl. If ordinal e ects are already pushing towards a waste reduction and a Pareto improvement then it
su cies to have the cardinal e ect weak enough not to o set the ordinal e ects. If, instead, ordinal e ects
push towards a waste increase and lower utility for h-types, then we can think of a cardinal deﬁnition of
status such that the status of being considered rich, H, is not very much sensitive to the income of l-types
and h-types while the status of being considered poor, L, is sensitive enough to induce a large change in
L but not so much to have condition (19) satisﬁed. Under such a deﬁnition of status we have that taxing
labor income and evenly redistributing the tax revenue makes l-types better o : l-types consume more
inconspicuous goods, their status increases – as L increases – and they enjoy more leisure. Moreover, l-
types ﬁnd it less convenient to engage in social competition because the status prize, H   L, is now smaller.
This decreases the amount of conspicuous consumption that h-types must use to separate themselves from
l-types. Therefore, h-types can be made better o : h-types lose at most a little in terms of their status –
because H does not change much – while they certainly increase both their inconspicuous consumption
and their leisure due to the reduced competition for status – i.e. x  decreases. This case is by no means
exceptional. For instance, deﬁnitions of social status based on relative deprivation (Runciman, 1966) and
upward-looking comparisons (Bowles and Park, 2005) do have similar characteristics.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the impact of labor income taxes when agents can signal their relative
standing by spending on a conspicuous good. We have assumed that tax revenue is redistributed by means
13of lump sum transfers and that status depends on the distribution of net incomes. Our main result is the
characterization of how the desirability of a labor income tax depends on the deﬁnition of social status.
We contribute in two ways to the literature on optimal labor income taxation under status concerns.
In the ﬁrst place, consistently with the insights of Ireland (1998) and Corneo (2002), we have proved that
under ordinal status the introduction of a labor income tax is desirable only if the pre-tax wage distribution
is not too unequal. More precisely, we have characterized the relevant threshold values of the pre-tax wage
distribution showing that, while the low income people are always made better o , we have three di erent
cases for what concerns waste in conspicuous consumption and satisfaction of high income people. If the
pre-tax wage distribution is highly unequal then waste is increased and high income people are made worse
o ; if, instead, the pre-tax wage distribution is quite unequal then waste is decreased but high income
people are still made worse o ; ﬁnally, if the pre-tax wage distribution is only mildly unequal then waste is
decreased and high income people are made better o .
In the second place, we have analyzed the e ects of taxing and redistributing labor income under cardi-
nal status. In particular, we have provided two novel ﬁndings. Firstly, we have shown that results obtained
for ordinal status need not hold for cardinal status. Indeed, under cardinal status it is neither true that
lowly productive individuals are always made better o  by the introduction of a labor income tax, nor that
a greater inequality in pre-tax wage rates makes waste reduction more likely. Most importantly, we have
proved that under cardinal status a labor income tax can be Pareto improving even if pre-tax wage rates are
extremely unequal. Secondly, we have shown that if status is cardinal in the sense that the status di erential
between being considered rich and being considered poor is strongly dependent on the income of the rich,
then a labor income tax is more likely to increase waste than it would be under ordinal status. This result
is an outcome of a peculiar characteristic of our model: labor income plays the twofold role of generating
social status and granting the purchasing power required for the signal. Thus, the introduction of a labor in-
come tax might move the economy towards vicious equilibria sustained by the fact that a high conspicuous
consumption requires a high income that in turn makes the status of being considered rich highly valuable
(with respect to the status of being considered poor) and, hence, it makes conspicuous consumption worth
its spending.
Our ﬁndings are relevant, we believe, for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is that they provide an argument
in favor of the claim that, in models with status concerns, the applied deﬁnition of status should be care-
fully discussed and motivated (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2008a). In other words, the modeling of people’s
concerns for relative standing should be considered a major issue in the construction of status models. We
emphasize this point because status models are quickly becoming a common fact in public economics, while
we are still missing a serious investigation about what deﬁnitions of social status are more appropriate in
the various cases of interest.
The second reason is more speciﬁc to the issue of the optimal tax policy. Especially in the light of
our proposition 4, we can conclude that the degree of pre-tax wage inequality does not imply much per se
about the desirability of a labor income tax. In particular, under some deﬁnitions of status a greater wage
inequality may ask for a greater taxation and redistribution whereas under some other deﬁnitions it may ask
for exactly the opposite. Therefore, our contribution indicates that the question of what is the optimal labor
tax under status concerns can only be answered by previously conducting an adequate (we think empirical)
research on the way social status is computed and evaluated by people.
14APPENDIX
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Result 1
The result is immediately got from (11) by noticing that e
L H
1+a < 1 for L < H.
A.2. Proof of Result 2
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Note that a su cient condition for (28) to be negative is 2 E     (1    )E , which is satisﬁed for every
    [0,1].
A.3. Proof of Result 3
The equilibrium income of l-types is
y 
l = wl(Z   z 
l)(1    ) + T =
Zwl(1    ) + T
1 + a
. (29)
Taking the derivative with respect to   we get that dy 
l/d  > 0 if and only if dT/d  > Zwl. Moreover, the
equilibrium income of h-types is
y 
h = wh(Z   z 
h)(1    ) + T =
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Taking the derivative with respect to   we get that dy 

















We note that for   = 0 the above inequality does not hold. Furthermore, since d2T/d 2 < 0 (as shown in
proof of result 2), we conclude that inequality (31) never holds for     [0,1].
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From the proof of result 2 we know that the ﬁrst term of the right hand side is decreasing in  . Moreover,
the second term of the right hand side is equal to 0 at   = 0. Therefore, if d(H L)/d    0 and dT/d  < wlZ
at   = 0, then dT/d  < wlZ for all     [0,1].
A.5. Proof of Proposition 1
Since types separate, xl   xh. We now prove that y 
h > y 
l. If y 
h = y 
l, then there would be no interest
in signalling, and xl = 0 = xh, against the hypothesis of xl   xh. Suppose then that y 
l > y 
h. In equilibrium
l-type individuals must ﬁnd it not convenient to deviate from xl to xh, therefore
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We will now prove that h-type individuals must strictly prefer choosing x 
l than x 
h, and so no equilibrium
can exist for the case y 
l > y 
h. First note that if x 
l < x 
h then it is immediate to conclude that h-type
individuals strictly prefer x 
l to x 
h. Hence, suppose x 
l > x 
l. We take the derivative with respect of wl –
evaluated at a generic w – of both the left hand side and right hand side of the above inequality, and we
easily establish the following inequality:
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w + Zw(1    )
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w(1    )Z + T   apxh
 
a
w + Zw(1    )
,
which implies, together with (33), that h-type individuals strictly gain passing from x 
h to x 
l. Therefore, it
must be that y 
h > y 
l.
By the above result and the assumption that the lower income group spend nothing on signalling, we
get xl = 0 and (6) is established. Consider the set of x 
h such that there exist z 
l, z 
h, µ  which, together with
x 
l = 0 and x 
h, form a separating equilibrium. If the inﬁmum of such a set did not belong to the set, then
by a continuity argument we could not ﬁnd any neighboring x 
h belonging to the set, thus contradicting the
deﬁnition of inﬁmum. Then the inﬁmum must belong to the set. Moreover, any inﬁmum is unique. This
completes the proof of the existence and uniqueness claim in the proposition.
We now illustrate how to derive the equilibrium values other than (6). At ﬁrst we have to recognize that,
in the unique equilibrium we are dealing with, l-type agents must be indi erent between their equilibrium
choice and mimicking h-type agents by acquiring xh. Clearly l-types cannot strictly prefer xh, because in
any Nash equilibrium they are optimizing at xl. If they strictly preferred xl, however, we could construct a
belief function allowing h-types to save on signalling and still to separate from l-types. In such a case the
requirement of minimum expenditure in signalling would be violated. Therefore, l-types must necessarily
be indi erent between xl and xh. In the light of (4) and (6), the following condition must be satisﬁed:
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Thanks to the log-speciﬁcation, from (34) we can easily derive (7). Inserting (6) and (7) in (4) and exploiting
equilibrium conditions, we obtain (8) and (9). Finally, we substitute (8) and (9) into the deﬁnition of
balanced budget transfer T, and we obtain (10).
A.6. Proof of Proposition 2
We prove that  x >  h, and then the proposition follows from the inequalities (17), (16) and (12) estab-
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Multiplying both sides by 1   e
L H
1+a (1    ), the above inequality becomes
1











1+a (1    )
 






1+a (1    )
 





which simpliﬁes to 1/(1    ) > 1, that is always true for     (0,1).
A.7. Proof of Proposition 3
From (29) and (30) we get
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Plugging (37) in (36) and assuming that the indirect cardinal e ect is di erent from zero, we can solve for




























17Considering the value of dT/d  at   = 0 (see proof of result 2) it can be shown that the numerator of (38) is
negative if and only if
wh
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The coe cient of wh is negative while the coe cient of wl might be either negative or positive. It follows
that if (39) holds for wh = wl then it holds for any wh > wl. Imposing wh = wl we get that inequality (39)
holds if and only if (1    )
 




< 1 which is always the case. Therefore, the numerator of (38) is
negative. From this follows the equivalence result in (19).
The remaining part of the proposition can be proved by noting that
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Since the ﬁrst term of (40) is negative, if expression (40) is positive then it must be that dx /d  is positive.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 4
We want to show that, for any given value of wh/wl > 1, we can ﬁnd an array of values for H, L, Hyh,
Hyl, Lyh, Lyl such that:












> 0 at   = 0.
Fix wh/wl > 1 and suppose that Hyl = Lyh = 0. Equation (18), (22) and (23) then become, respectively,
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Consider then the case where dT/d  < wlZ – i.e. the ordinal e ect on waste is negative – which implies
that dyl/d  < 0, that dT/d  < whZ, and that the ﬁrst two terms of the right-hand side of (44) sum up to a






we get that inequality (43) and (44)
are satisﬁed and that dx /d  < 0. Note that this holds for any value of H and L such that H > L.
Consider now the case where dT/d  > wlZ – i.e. the ordinal e ect on waste is positive – which implies
that dyl/d  > 0 and that the ﬁrst two terms of the right-hand side of (44) sum up to a negative amount. Then
by setting Hyh = 0 we get that inequality (43) is satisﬁed while the negativity of dx /d  and the positivity
of the left-hand side of (44) are obtained, respectively, if and only if
Lyl >
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For given values of H and L the right-hand sides of (45) and (46) are ﬁnite numbers. Therefore, for such
values, there exists Lyl > 0 such that both (45) and (46) are satisﬁed.
The proof concludes by noting that for any given array of values for H, L, Hyh, Hyl, Lyh, Lyl such that
H > L, Hyh   0, Hyl   0, Lyh   0, Lyl   0, we can always ﬁnd di erentiable functions H(yh,yl) and L(yh,yl)
that are consistent with such an array.
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